

considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own existence. The students, alienated like the slave in the Hegelian dialectic, accept their ignorance as justifying the teacher's existence-but, unlike the slave, they never discover that they educate the teacher.

The *raison d'être* of libertarian education, on the other hand, lies in its drive towards reconciliation. Education must begin with the solution of the teacher-student contradiction, by reconciling the poles of the contradiction so that both are simultaneously teachers *and* students. [page 72, italics in the original text.]

The problem-posing method does not dichotomize the activity of the teacher-student: she is not "cognitive" at one point and "narrative" at another. She is always "cognitive," whether preparing a project or engaging in dialogue with the students. He does not regard cognizable objects as his private property, but as the object of reflection by himself and the students. In this way, the problem-posing educator constantly re-forms his reflections in the reflection of the students. The students-no longer docile listeners-are now critical co-investigators in dialogue with the teacher. The teacher presents the material to the students for their consideration, and re-considers her earlier considerations as the students express their own. The role of the problem-posing educator is to create; together with the students, the conditions under which knowledge at the level of the *doxa* is superseded by true knowledge, at the level of the *logos*.

Whereas banking education anesthetizes and inhibits creative power, problem-posing education involves a constant unveiling of reality. The former attempts to maintain the *submersion* of consciousness; the latter strives for the *emergence* of consciousness and *critical intervention* in reality. [p. 80 – 81, italics in the original text.]

Only dialogue, which requires critical thinking, is also capable of generating critical thinking. Without dialogue there is no communication, and without communication there can be no true education. Education which is able to resolve the contradiction between teacher and student takes place in a situation in which both address their act of cognition to the object by which they are mediated. Thus, the dialogical character of education as the practice of freedom does not begin when the teacher-student meets with the students-teachers in a pedagogical situation, but rather when the former first asks herself or himself *what* she or he will dialogue with the latter *about*. And preoccupation with the content of dialogue is really preoccupation with the program content of education. [p. 92 – 93, italics in the original text.]

Freire, P., **Pedagogy of the oppressed**, 30th Anniversary Edition, (Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos with an introduction by Macedo, D.,) Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., New York 2003.

(iii) Science is rooted in creative interpretation. Numbers suggest, constrain, and refute; they do not, by themselves, specify the content of scientific theories. Theories are built upon the interpretation of numbers, and interpreters are often trapped by their own rhetoric. They believe in their own objectivity, and fail to discern the prejudice that leads them to one interpretation among many consistent with their numbers. [p. 74]

Gould, S. J., **The mismeasure of man**, Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1981, 1984*.

(iv) (a) Ramose, M B, **In search of an African philosophy of education**, 2004 (Attached)

(b) Ramose, M B, **Teacher and student with a critical pan-epistemic orientation**, 2016 (Attached).

Day two: Lecture

A philosophical investigation into the conceptual history of decolonisation in Africa.

- **Readings: “The epistemic decolonial turn”** Ramon Grosfoguel (2007) *Cultural Studies*, 21:2-3, 211 – 223
- **Critique of Grosfoguel’s “The epistemic decolonial turn”** Mogobe Ramose (**unpublished** but attached).

Recommended readings:

- Nkrumah, K., **Consciencism Philosophy and ideology for de-colonisation**, Panaf Books, London, 1964, 1970.
- Okot p’ Bitek, **Africa’s cultural revolution**, Macmillan Books for Africa, Nairobi, 1973.
- Ngugi wa Thiong’o, **Decolonizing the mind**, Zimbabwe Publishing House (Pvt.) Ltd., Harare, 1981.
- Wiredu, K., **Conceptual decolonization in African philosophy**, Hope Publications, Ibadan, 1995.
- Fanon, F., **Toward the African revolution**, (Translated from the French by Haakon Chevalier) Grove Press, Inc., New York, 1967.

The following citations are drawn from Fanon’s text cited above.

What defines the colonial situation is rather the undifferentiated character that foreign domination presents. The colonial situation is first of all a military conquest continued and reinforced by a civil and police administration. ... Colonialism is not a type of individual relations but the conquest of a national territory and the oppression of a people:... p. 81

The oppressed peoples know today that national liberation is a part of the process of historic development but they also know that this liberation must be the work of the oppressed people.

It is the colonial peoples who must liberate themselves from colonial domination.

True liberation is not that pseudo-independence in which ministers having a limited responsibility hobnob with an economy dominated by the colonial pact.

Liberation is the total destruction of the colonial system, from the pre-eminence of the language of the oppressor and “departmentalization,” to the customs union that in reality maintains the former colonized in the meshes of the culture, of the fashion, and of the images of the colonialist. p. 105

Afterwards, when the time came to withdraw from the territory, the colonialists were forced to discard their masks. In the negotiations on independence, the first matters at issue were the economic interests: banks, monetary areas, research permits, commercial concessions, inviolability of properties stolen from the peasants at the time of the conquest, ...

The acceptance of a nominal sovereignty and the absolute refusal of real independence-such is the typical reaction of colonialist nations with respect to their former colonies. Neo-colonialism is impregnated with a few ideas which both constitute its force and at the same time prepare its necessary decline. p. 121

- Biko, S., **Black consciousness and the quest for a true humanity**, (Attached).

Day three

Lecture

The humanisation (mothofatso) of the educational curriculum

The following is the thesis to be defended in the proposed lecture: **“Science” is not prior to the unfolding order arising out of the chaos of contingent be-ing.**

Readings:

- Wiredu, K., **Philosophy and an African culture**, Cambridge University Press, 1980. [One of the major theses posited by Wiredu in this text is that the acquisition of technological know-how by Africa must be underpinned by its “humanist principles”.]
- SARTON, G., **Introduction to the history of science**, Volume 1, From Homer to Omar Khayyam, The Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1927. (Reprinted 1945, 1950. Published for the Carnegie Institution of Washington)
- “The greatest conquest of science, philosophically speaking, is the notion of the relativity of knowledge; that is, our trust in science, though steadily increasing, is always qualified and limited. ... We might say that a pseudo-science is one which is based upon wrong principles or whose aims are unsound, but the principles and even the aims of science are not immovable”. (p. 6)
- “If science is more than an accumulation of facts; if it is not simply positive knowledge, but systematized positive knowledge; if it is not simply unguided analysis and haphazard empiricism, but synthesis; if it is not simply a passive recording, but a constructive activity; then, undoubtedly, Hellas was its cradle. ... (p. 8) It becomes increasingly easy to tell where they found their rough material, but this hardly helps us to understand what enabled them to assume a scientific attitude and to give the earliest conspicuous examples of scientific investigations which were at once deliberate and disinterested”. (p. 9) **Comment.** *The claim that Hellas is the “cradle” of science is contentious at least on two grounds: (i) Biological anthropology does not point to Hellas as the “cradle” of **homo sapiens**. It is inconceivable that **homo sapiens** did not during the millennia before the exodus from Africa, develop a “scientific attitude” satisfying the author’s criteria of deliberateness and disinterestedness. (ii) was there neither “science” nor philosophy when, for example, Aristotle, visited the Alexandria of ancient Egypt?*
- Ramose M B **“A philosophy without memory cannot abolish slavery”** (published and attached)
- Sampie Terreblanche, **Lost in transformation**, KMM Review Publishing Company (Pty) Ltd, Sandton, 2012.

- Review of Sampie's text, Conversation, hereto attached.

Day four

Lecture

A philosophical critique of "the right of conquest"

Readings:

That the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war with another, and Unjustly invades another man's right, can, by such unjust war, never come To have a right over the conquered, will be easily agreed by all men, who Will not think that robbers and pirates have a right of empire over Whomsoever they have force enough to master, or that men are bound by promises which unlawful force extorts from them. ... From whence it is plain that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered.

John LOCKE, Two treatises of civil government, Chapter XVI, *Of Conquest*

- Miller, R J., **The future of International Law in indigenous affairs: the doctrine of Discovery, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States.** (Attached)
- Ramose, M B., In memoriam (Attached)
- Bethell, L., (ed.) **The independence of Latin America**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.

The following citations are drawn from the above text.

The Spanish empire in America rested upon a balance of power groups-the administration, the Church, and the local elite. The administration possessed political though little military power, and delivered its authority from the sovereignty of the crown and its own bureaucratic function. p. 6

The imperial role of Spain and the dependence of America were put to their final test during the long war with Britain from 1796. p. 20

The Spanish trade monopoly came to an effective end in the period 1799-1801, and the economic independence of the colonies was brought considerably closer. p. 21

On 27 June 1806 a British expeditionary force from the Cape of Good Hope occupied Buenos Aires. ... The British invasions of Buenos Aires taught a number of lessons. Spanish Americans, it seemed, were unwilling to exchange one imperial master for another. Yet Spain could take little comfort from this. Its colonial defences had been exposed and its

administration humiliated. The deposition of a viceroy was an unprecedented event with revolutionary significance. It was the local inhabitants, not Spain, who had defended the colony. The creoles in particular had tasted power, discovered their strength and acquired a new sense of identity, even of nationality. Thus, the weakness of Spain in America brought the creoles into politics. p. 23

Everywhere in Spanish America the wars of independence, when they came, were civil wars between the defenders and opponents of Spain, and the creoles were to be found on both sides. p. 26

If the creoles had one eye on their masters, they kept the other on their servants. The creoles were intensely aware of social pressure from below, and they strove to keep the coloured people at a distance. Race prejudice created in Americans an ambivalent attitude towards Spain. The *peninsulares* were undoubtedly pure whites, even if they were poor immigrants. Americans were more or less white, and even the wealthiest were conscious of race mixture, anxious to prove their whiteness, if necessary by litigation. But race was complicated by social, economic and cultural interests, and white supremacy was not unchallenged; beyond its defences swarmed Indians, *mestizos*, free blacks, mulattos and slaves. In parts of Spanish America slave revolt was so fearful a prospect that the creoles would not lightly leave the shelter of imperial government or desert the ranks of the dominant whites. On the other hand, Bourbon policy allowed more opportunities for social mobility. ... The demographic increase of the castes in the course of the eighteenth century, together with growing social mobility, alarmed the whites and bred in them a new awareness of race and a determination to preserve discrimination. This could be seen in the Rio de la Plata, in New Granada, and in other parts of Spanish America. But it was Venezuela, with its plantation economy, slave labour force and numerous *pardos* – together forming 61 per cent of the population – which took the lead in rejecting the social policy of the Bourbons and established a climate of the revolution to come. p. 27-28 [Italics in the original text.]

This presentiment of nationality was far more subversive of Spanish sovereignty and far more conducive to independence than specific demands for reform and change. At the same time as Americans began to disavow Spanish nationality they were also aware of differences among themselves, for even in their pre-national state the various colonies rivalled each other in their resources and their pretensions. America was too vast a continent and too vague a concept to attract individual loyalty. Men were primarily Mexicans, Venezuelans, Peruvians, Chileans, and it was in their own country, not America, that they found their national home. These countries were defined by their history, administrative boundaries, physical environment, which marked them off not only from Spain but also from each other; they were the homes of societies, each of them unique, and economies, all with different interests. p. 38-39

These men were true precursors of independence, though they were a small minority and ahead of public opinion. The creoles had many objections to the colonial regime, but these were pragmatic rather than ideological; in the ultimate analysis the greatest threat to

Spanish rule came from American interests rather than European ideas. Yet the distinction perhaps is unreal. The thought of the Enlightenment was part of the complex of contributing factors, at once an impulse, a medium and a justification of the revolution to come. If the Enlightenment was not an isolated 'cause' of independence, it was part of its history; it provided some of the ideas which informed it and became an essential ingredient of Latin American liberalism in the post-independence period. During the wars of independence and after, men of identical economic interest and social position frequently took opposite political standpoints. Ideas had their own power, convictions their own persuasion. p. 43

In 1791 the French Caribbean colony of Saint-Domingue was engulfed in a massive slave revolt. Saint-Domingue was a prototype, the most productive colony in the New World, its sole function to export sugar and coffee to the metropolis. For this purpose France had established a military and bureaucratic presence, a plantation economy and a slave labour force held down by violence. The social situation was always explosive, not simply because of the merciless exploitation of half a million slaves and the degradation of the free colours, but also because of divisions within the white minority. In its spectacle of disintegration, of *grand blanc* against *petit blanc*, white against mulatto, mulatto against black, Saint-Domingue was colonial America in microcosm. The Revolution of 1789 acted as an instant dissolvent, arousing different responses to the opportunity of liberty and equality, and releasing social and racial tensions long suppressed. In the knowledge that the master race was hopelessly divided, the slaves rose in revolt in August 1791, attacked plantations and their owners, and began a long and ferocious struggle for abolition of slavery and independence from France. French policy wavered between abolition decreed by the National Assembly and the attempt of Napoleon to reconquer the island for France and slavery. But in the end France had to admit defeat, and on 1 January 1804 black and mulatto generals proclaimed the new state of Haiti, the first black republic in the Americas. p. 45 [Italics in the original text.]

To Spanish America Haiti was an example and a warning, observed by rulers and ruled alike with growing horror. The creoles could now see the inevitable result of loss of unity in the metropolis, loss of nerve by the authorities, and loss of control by the colonial ruling class. Haiti represented not only independence but revolution, not only liberty but equality. The new regime systematically exterminated the remaining whites and prevented any white from re-establishing himself as a proprietor; it recognized as Haitian any black and mulatto of African descent born in other colonies, slave or free, and these were invited to desert; and it declared war on the slave trade. These social and racial policies branded Haiti as an enemy in the eyes of all colonial and slave regimes in the Americas, and they took immediate steps to protect themselves, none more vigorously than Spain, which in the course of the Haitian revolution had lost the adjacent colony of Santo Domingo. In November 1791, within three months of the outbreak, Spanish colonial authorities were warned to adopt defensive measures against contagion. Haitian blacks were denied entry to Spanish colonies, and even white refugees were suspect. p. 45

Throughout most of the period of the revolutions and wars for Spanish American independence the papacy maintained its traditional alliance with the Spanish crown – and its

opposition to liberal revolution. In his encyclical *Etsi longissimo* (30 January 1816) Pius VII urged the bishops and clergy of Spanish America to make clear the dreadful consequences of rebellion against legitimate authority. Later, however, the Vatican became more politically neutral, partly in response to petitions from Spanish America and concern for the spiritual welfare of the faithful there, and partly because of the anticlerical measures taken by the liberal government in Spain after the Revolution of 1820, culminating in the expulsion of the papal nuncio in January 1823. The pope finally agreed to send a papal mission to the Rio de la Plata and Chile. (Among the delegates was the future Pius IX (1846-78), who became therefore the first pope to have visited the New World. But shortly before it left Pius VII died (on 28 September 1823 the day that Ferdinand VII was restored to full absolutist power in Spain). Under Pope Leo XII, a strong defender of legitimate sovereignty, Rome's attitude to the Spanish American revolutions for independence hardened once again. His encyclical *Etsi iam diu* (24 September 1824) offered the Spanish king and the royalists in Spanish America the total support of the papacy at the precise moment when they were about to suffer their final defeat. These were political misjudgements not unknown in the history of the papacy and they did not permanent damage the Church. p. 228-229 [Italics in the original text.]